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RD. Alexander (1987) has proposed that the ultimate 
grounds of ethics are evolutionary. Humans have the 
capacity for moral reasoning and negotiation, together 
with a system of appropriate emotions, such as shame 
and guilt when we do wrong, and a sense ofmoral well-
being when we do right, because these abilities tended 
to increase our ancestors' inclusive fitness in the past. 
Fairly simple mathematical models can illustrate how 
this could work-one example is the Prisoner's 
Dilemma problem in which two individuals must act 
cooperatively if they are to maximise their 'survival 
points' over a series of interactions (Axelrod, 1984). In 
the Prisoner's Dilemma, mutual cooperation leads to 
an intermediate score for both parties; mutual defection 
gives both a low score, but if one cooperates and the 
other defects, then the cooperator scores no points, while 
the defector scores maximum points. Over a series of 
games the program that achieved the best scores was 
one called TIT FOR TAT, which cooperated unless its 
partner defected, but after a defection subsequently did 
whatever the partner did on the previous round, thus 
'punishing' defection and 'rewarding' cooperation. 
It might appear tllat an evolutionary tlleory of the 
origin of ethics can never be compatible with the 
inclusion of nonhumans in our moral systems, because 
any tendency to give weight to their interests would 
always be disadvantageous; would tend to reduce 
inclusive fitness, and hence would involve a basic 
conflict with the ultimate grounds of human ethics. I 
hope to show that this strong view of the impossibility 
of animal rights is untrue, although there are grounds 
for holding a weaker view that proposes that, when 
interests conflict, humans will always have some 
tendency to favour relatives over non-relatives, friends 
over strangers, and other humans over nonhumans. 
Alexander himself believes (pp. 156ff.) that tlle 
selective value of indirect reciprocity may be enough 
to account for a human tendency to give sentient animals 
some status in their moral systems. He suggests that a 
person who (for example) was observed by other 
humans to be kind and reliable when handling pet 
animals would appear to them to be more trustworthy 
than someone who behaved cruelly. Trustworthy people 
would tend to be given preferential treatment, and, if it 
is true that behaviour towards animals tends to be a 
good predictor of future behaviour towards other 
humans, then tllere would be selection both for kindness 
towards animals and for a tendency to approve of such 
kindness in other people. The approvers benefit by being 
able to make successful predictions about the behaviour 
of other people because they are enabled to 'invest' 
help in partners who are likely to reciprocate. 
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Alexander seems slightly dubious whether we 
should regard these feelings as real moral sentiments if 
they are based on the 'selfish' behaviour of the genes. 
However tllere does not seem to be any good reason 
why we should not say tllat people have real emotions 
offriendliness towards (some) animals and real feelings 
of approval and disapproval when they are treated well 
or badly. f these feelings are ultimately caused by tlle 
selection of genes to produce nervous systems that 
respond in particular ways to certain environmental 
conditions this does not affect their reality. We do not, 
after all, believe that our sensations are illusory just 
because there are good evolutionary reasons why they 
should have evolved. 
A real difficulty with the idea of indirect reciprocity 
as the sole ground for inclusion of animals in our moral 
system seems to me to be the suggestion thar our 
behaviour towards them is only significant as a marker 
of potential behaviour towards other humans. Thus, 
Peter Carruthers argues in his book The Animals Issue 
(1992, pp. 153f.), that we have no direct duties to 
animals, merely a duty to our fellow humans not to 
behave in ways that would tend to erode our capacity 
for sympathy, because this capacity is beneficial to the 
smooth functioning of society. For Carruthers, sentient 
animals do not have a status in their own right but moral 
behaviour towards them is just a marker, or signal, of 
particular kinds of human behavioural disposition, or 
perhaps a kind of training. There seems no reason why 
sometlling else should not be substituted, such as moral 
behaviour towards cars, bicycles, plants or rocks. 
However, this implies that our moral behaviour is 
consciously calculated in a way it probably is not. 
Behaviour towards animals is a significant predictor of 
behaviour towards other humans because it is a response 
to something humans and animals have in common, 
not because we are deliberately saying, "look what a 
decent person I am," when we treat animals well. If I 
observe that someone habitually avoids hurting 
animals then that is good evidence that he or she is a 
kindly individual who is distressed by suffering-
exactly the kind of person I would want to have about 
if I were ever in trOUble. Conversely, someone who 
deliberately hurts animals very probably would have 
no compunction about hurting me and I would be very 
well advised to avoid them. Behaviour towards mere 
objects tells me very little about a person's character, 
at most, perhaps it may show whether she is careful or 
wasteful, whetller she appreciates art and so on. Thus, 
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even if we believe that the way we behave towards 
animals is ultimately only important because of its 
relevance to behaviour towards humans, sentient 
animals have a particular significance because they are 
the only entities besides humans themselves who can 
function in interactions which test attitudes towards 
mental events. 
If consideration for animals were no more than a 
method by which humans could signal to one another 
that they were worthy candidates for cooperative 
interactions, then there would be an immediate 
probability of deceptive signaling. This, in tum, would 
lead to selection pressure for an ability to detect 
individuals who were merely pretending and not really 
experiencing a concern for animals' suffering, which 
would restore the significance of animals' conscious-
ness as the basis of their moral status. 
Humans' capacity to act morally must depend on a 
constellation of abilities, several of which seem likely 
to be relevant to our behaviour towards other species. 
One essential element of moral capability must be the 
ability to understand that otller individuals have minds 
and feelings similar to one's own. Without this, none 
of the plausible theories of ethics could function. This 
ability would confer benefits independently of any 
involvement with our moral capability. For example, 
there is a considerable amount of evidence that we are 
able to predict tlle behaviour of other individuals by 
simulating or modeling tlleir minds (Whiten, 1991). 
This ability improves with age and experience-for 
example, four-year-old children find it very difficult to 
distinguish between the infonnation needed to allow 
another person to be sure what will happen in a test and 
that which will only allow him to guess (because two 
or more outcomes are equally likely). They also have 
trouble predicting that two-year-old and six-year-old 
children will act differently. Three-year-old children are 
aware that other individuals have feelings and wants, 
and tlley are able to use these concepts to explain their 
behaviour, "the boy went out because he wanted to play 
in the snow." However they find it difficult to 
understand tlle concept of true and false beliefs, for 
example a trick in which a Coca-Cola tin was filled 
with milk in the children's presence and then offered to 
an individual who had just entered the room did not 
seem to make any sense to them. 
This may be partly due to an inability to understand 
tlleir own thought processes and reasons for believing 
something is true. It has been shown that 3 year olds 
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can successfully playa game in which they must make 
a choice between three inverted cups (one of which 
covers a sweet) if the sweet is hidden in their presence, 
or if an experimenter points to the correct cup, but they 
cannot explain how they know which cup is correct. 
Four-year-old children, on the other hand, have no 
difficulty in explaining that they know the sweet is 
there 'because I saw you hide it' or 'because you 
pointed to that cup.' These results are paralleled by 
tests in which the children had to choose between a 
cup pointed to by someone they knew had seen the 
sweet hidden and one pointed to by someone who was 
blindfolded while the sweet was hidden. Four-year-
olds had no diftlculty in predicting that only the person 
who saw the sweet hidden could point it out, but three 
year olds did not seem to be able to make the distinction. 
This seems good evidence that understanding of one's 
own mind is a necessary condition for understanding 
the minds of others. 
This kind of experiment illustrates very clearly how 
possession of a successful 'theory of mind' enables 
the child to become increasingly competent in 
understanding and predicting the behaviour of other 
people and functioning within society. Children who 
lack the ability to develop a normal theory of mind are 
drastically handicapped in comparison, and this appears 
to be the cause of childhood autism. Autistic children 
have great diftlculty in deciding what other people are 
thinking and appear to achieve such insight only as a 
result of laborious 'behaviourist' rea~oning. Like three-
year aIds, they are unable to make sense of false-belief 
tasks and jokes, and this does not seem to be simply a 
function of level of intelligence, since Downs 
Syndrome children with a mental age of 4 or more 
have no difficulty with these tesL~. Interestingly, autistic 
adults have been reported as complaining that they 
"could not read people's thoughts like other people" 
(Howlin and Rutter, 1987, p. 79), and seem to need to 
learn to understand social cues by a laborious process 
of memorisation. 
Normal people seem to gain insight into the minds 
of others by a process of imaginative sympathy (Harris, 
1991). By simulating the minds of others they are able 
to make successful predictions that enable them to 
become effective members of their society. However, 
this kind of simulation means that the simulator 
experiences a 'mirrored' version of the simulated mind. 
This effect must provide a powerful motivation to act 
according to the "golden rule" of Do-as-you-would-be-
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done-by. See Laurence Blum's article, 'Particularity and 
Responsiveness' (1987) and Iris Murdoch's The 
Sovereignty of Good (1970) for further arguments that 
there is a natural connection between knowing about 
distressed states and being motivated to relieve them. 
The ability to think about the mental states of others 
is an essential basis for true morality. Individuals who 
lack this cannot be moral agents because they can have 
no conception that their behaviour can be good or bad 
for others, only at most a conception that some kinds 
of action may cause reprisals from others or may cause 
them to cry out. However, individuals who do possess 
the ability to think about mental states are not restricted 
to thinking about the mental states of other moral agents. 
If such individuals have a reason to simulate the mental 
states of other animals they will experience the same 
kind of motivation to avoid causing suffering and to 
promote happiness that they experience when 
simulating the mental states of other humans. 
Angus Ross (1983) makes the interesting related 
suggestion that the human ability to perceive distress 
in others is a capacity that evolved by generalisation 
from a more specialised ability to perceive the distress 
of young that is possessed by many other vertebrates. 
He argues that recognition of distress is not developed 
by induction from understanding of one's own mental 
states, but that there exists a primitive condition in which 
the animal can recognise and respond appropriately to 
distress in some others and can experience distress, but 
lacks the cognitive ability to understand the corre-
spondence between these two situations. In this 
primitive condition, action to relieve perceived distress 
has survival value because it will usually mean that 
related individuals are helped to survive. With the 
evolution of more general capacities for thinking about 
mental events, certain species developed the ability to 
understand the correspondence between distress in 
oneself and in others. 
For Ross, the human capacity to think about the self 
as an individual in distress (rather than just experiencing 
distress), is a 'bottom-up' process that depends crucially 
upon a pre-existing ability to perceive and label distress 
in others. A species that did not have such a pre-existent 
capacity would be unlikely to eVOlve complex social 
cognition. Humans who are born without the primitive 
capacity to recognise distress will not develop normal 
social cognition. In this paper, I have generally assumed 
that understanding of other minds is a 'top-down' 
process in which self-conscious analysis of one's own 
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mind and simulation of otllers play tlle predominant 
parts. However, it seems likely that boili kinds ofprocess 
are important, and, in particular, a defect in some of the 
primitive systems for perceiving emotions in oiliers 
could explain why autistic children appear to react 
abnormally to oilier people at very young ages when 
even normal children are not expected to have a ilieory 
of mind. Ross's ilieory is also interesting because it 
suggests iliat altruism has its roots in cooperative 
processes where ilie signaling and recognition of distress 
benefit boili interacting parties. For example, an older 
sibling can safely play-fight wiili a younger one if he 
breaks off the fight a<, soon a<> it gets too rough, but he 
can only tell if ilie game is too rough if he can recognise 
distress signals from tlle infant. 
The severe handicap of autistic children suggests 
iliat, if it is true that (some) oilier species of animal 
have minds, then humans who call iliink about animals' 
minds by a process of imaginative sympailiy will be 
much more successful in practical contacts wiili animals 
ilian those who are determined that they will be 
objective (Hearne, 1987, pp. 229-230). It seems iliat 
subjective iliought about animals allows us to improve 
our social skills of interaction wiili animals in ways 
tllat noiliing else call. 
There is some evidence iliat ilie formatioll of social 
bonds between humans and animals has practical 
implications-for example fear of humans has been 
shown to be a significant factor in farm animal 
production and stockworkers wiili good relationships 
with their allimals improved farm productivity 
(Hemsworili, Barnett and Coleman, 1992). In ilie same 
volume, Gordon Burghardt, notes: 
Captive bears, because of their large size and 
ability to maul human beings quickly, must 
be adapted to people so that experimental work 
can be carried out safely. Thus, the separation 
of boili experimenter and emotion from the 
training procedures in scientific studies wiili 
bears is just not possible. (Burghardt, 1992) 
And Sharon Crowell-Davis: 
Many researchers of horse behaviour whom I 
know personally have a major illterest in the 
species tllat extends outside tlleir professional 
life. Many own horses, and some would call 
tllemselves "horse-lovers." Most have at lea<>t 
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some experience wiili ilie species. Previous 
experience with horses probably has a 
significant effect on whether researchers 
become involved in studies of them. Research 
on horses is potentially dangerous, and one 
must be experienced in handling iliem and 
interpreting ilieir behaviour sufficiently to 
anticipate future movements iliat might cause 
injury. (Crowell-Davis, 1992) 
Oral evidence about ilie training of farm horsemen 
collected by George Ewart Evans also suggests 
similarities between ilie social mechanisms by which 
humans learn to cope wiili their own kind and iliose 
which they use to handle working animals. One 
informant related how, from the age of iliree, he learned 
ilie names of all ilie farm horses and ilieir individual 
characters. If he wa<> ill and unable to visit ilie stables, 
his failier would describe in detail how each horse had 
behaved that day. (Evans, 1979, p. 99). Similarly, ilie 
psychologist and riding instructor Moyra Williams 
(1971) suggests that observational knowledge of 
animals' behaviour ha<> to be 'compiled' into intuitive 
mentalistic rea<>oning about ilieir thoughts and emotions 
if we are to be able to anticipate their future reactions 
quickly enough to avoid getting hurt. 
The anthropologist G.P. Murdock (1980) confirms 
ilie special emotional relationship that exists between 
humans and ilieir domestic animals: 
...mutuality, a<> I am aware from having spent 
my boyhood and youili on a subsistence farm 
where I interacted intimately not only wiili 
milch cows but also wiili draft oxen and riding, 
driving and draft horses. My relations with all 
of iliem were characterized by a substantial 
measure of mutual confidence, respect and 
even affection, coupled with a sense of 
noblesse oblige... 
Murdock believes iliat his statistical analysis of ilie 
prevalence of different religious beliefs in primitive 
societies has shown that there is a very distinct 
psychological difference between lie practice of slavery 
and ilie use of working animals (1980, p. 86). 
Rheinhold Bergler (1988), concludes from his 
comprehensive study of ilie psychology of lie human-
dog relationship tllat liis is essentially social and bi-
directional, with the human partners gaining the 
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psychological and physical health benefits of 
association with dogs only if they are prepared to enter 
into a mutual relationship. Potential dog owners who 
viewed dog-ownership in purely 'rational' terms (more 
exercise and so on) were unlikely actually to take the 
step of acquiring an animal (p. 126). 
Ifa moral sense depends upon imaginative sympathy 
with others this could counter the objection that 
evolutionary explanations of morality fail because they 
cannot explain why we feel that wrong actions would 
remain wrong even if natural selection happened to 
'approve' of them. Since we all have direct experience 
of good and bad conscious events in our own lives and 
since one important part of a moral sense is the ability 
to imagine the feelings of otllers, there is a natural link 
between the moral sense developed by evolution and 
the values (also ultimately developed by evolution) of 
certain types of conscious experience. Thus, an 
evolution-based moral sense will tend to have a non-
arbitrary structure in a way tllat parallels the natural 
structuring of consciousness by the connection between 
pain and inj ury. It is possible to imagine a creature who 
had no tendency to avoid painful experiences, but such 
an animal would be unlikely to leave descendants. 
Similarly, a moral sense that approved, or was 
indifferent to, the infliction of suffering would imply 
something very wrong with its owner's capacity to 
simulate the feelings of others. A rational agent who 
lacked all sense that pain is an evil in itself would not 
be able to understand the motivations of other agents 
and, like the autistic patients, would be at a loss to 
predict what they might do next. This perhaps explains 
why Peter Carruthers (1992) cannot be content with 
the conclusion tllat we have no duties to animals because 
they are not contractors, but feels himself compelled to 
claim that they are mere automata. Because of the link 
between pain and damage, a moral sense that evolved 
because of a need for social cooperation would have to 
include a sense that pain is an evil for others as well as 
the self. Someone who did not understand this would 
not understand the minds of others at all, and someone 
who went about inflicting pain without provocation 
could not possibly be accepted as a cooperator. 
Once a moral sense exists and includes the belief 
that pain is an evil, then there is no good reason to 
exclude individuals, such as children and animals, who 
are not able to demand consideration. Contrary to Peter 
Carruthers' claim (1992, pp. 98ff.) that the most 
plausible version of an evolutionary theory of morality 
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is contractualist and that only rational agents will have 
any moral status in the resulting society, a natural moral 
sense would be expected to possess utilitarian elements. 
It might be possible to suggest a mixed view in which 
rational agents who already have some basic views 
about the values ofother individuals' mental states make 
rules that depend upon a combination of self-interest 
and concern for others. There are no logical reasons 
that compel rational agents acting under a veil of 
ignorance to choose rules that give protection to 
individuals who are not fully rational. However, if the 
only actual rational agents who exist are ones who have 
been produced by evolutionary processes, then these 
agents may be subject to constraints which mean that 
they are in fact compelled to give some kind of moral 
consideration to all conscious individuals. The 
deliberate decision to exclude from protection those 
individuals who are conscious, butnot capable oflogical 
rationality is itself a moral consideration of those 
individuals. Ifwe had really evolved to care only about 
what happens to rational agents there would only be a 
problem about animals' rights in the case of those 
species where we are unsure whether they should be 
classified as rational agents or not. 
A second possible objection to a view of an 
evolutionary grounding for animals' rights is the claim 
by some biologists (e.g. Kennedy 1992) that we have 
no good reason to believe that animals have sensations 
of any kind. There seem to be two main points at issue 
here. Firstly, it is sometimes simply claimed that it is 
illegitimate to assume that animals have subjective 
experiences because there is no way in which this can 
be scientifically proved. This claim can be countered 
in much the same way as sceptical claims that no-one 
has a good reason to believe in any subjective 
experiences other than her own, or that no-one has 
reason to believe that there is any real world which exists 
independently of her own mental experiences. A second, 
and more interesting claim, is that sensations themselves 
are generated by reasoned introspection of the self and 
that animals who do not show this kind of ability to 
reason probably have no experiences. There are two 
objections that can be made against this. On the one 
hand there is evidence that some species of animals do 
possess self-awareness, at least to a degree that is 
comparable to young human children, so this view of 
consciousness does not exclude all species of animals 
from moral concern. Chimpanzees seem to perform at 
about the level of four-year-old children in the 'hidden 
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sweet' test described earlier, since they choose to 
respond to pointing by an experimenter they know has 
seen the sweet hidden in preference to one who has 
not. Since, in human children, success or failure in this 
test seems to be correlated with ability to explain the 
connection between seeing and knowing, this appears 
to be good evidence that chimpanzees have at least this 
much introspective understanding of their own minds. 
Furthermore, if consciousness depends on some level 
of information processing, since we know that four-
year-old humans are conscious because some of us 
can remember being four years old, chimpanzees must 
also be conscious. 
TIle evidence from young children also demonstrates 
how painfully difficult thinking about thinking actually 
is. Because it comes naturally to us as adult humans we 
have a tendency to suppose that reflecting about our 
thoughts is a simple process that really is rather like 
turning a light on our own minds. Thus Peter Carruthers 
claims (1992, pp. 185-6) that the observation that 
chimpanzees cannot use self-critical thought to avoid 
wasting time and energy when searching for pieces of 
hidden food proves they cannot think about their own 
thoughts at all, and are probably non-conscious. Amore 
plausible account of animal thought seems to be that 
the animal spends most of his time in a 'sea' of 
unexplained experiences where decision-making 
generally feels like guessing does to us. He may know 
that an object is present but cannot know how he knows. 
This would be a very disturbing state of affairs for an 
adult human, but, like our two or three year olds, the 
animal experiences no pressing need for an explanation 
of his world in terms of serial logic. At the level of the 
chimpanzee, or of the human four-year old, the animal 
is just beginning to develop the power of explanation, 
and to know that he thinks there is a sweet hidden 
because he saw it put under the jar. 
Comparison between young humans and adult 
animals must be used with caution but this kind of study 
may at least suggest significant avenues for inves-
tigation of what their experiences must be like. For 
example, human two-year-olds seem to understand 
desires, but not beliefs (Wellman, 1990, pp. 207-242). 
Accordingly, it would be expected that animals less 
intelligent than the chimpanzee will fail on "theory of 
mind" tasks that require attribution of belief (like the 
hidden sweet task), but might still succeed on ones that 
only require an understanding of motivation. This is 
potentially signifiCant if we are interested in the sorts 
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of points which Peter Singer and Tom Regan have 
discussed concerning the wrongness of killing animals. 
Both these authors are interested in the question of 
whether some kinds of animals are 'subjects of a life' 
or 'persons' rather than simply composites of immediate 
sensations. Philosophers have usually tended to hold 
that there is a tight connection between desire and belief, 
and that an organism can not be said to desire something 
unless it also has beliefs about that something. The 
evidence from young children may indicate that desires 
are prior to beliefs (since understanding of desires 
precedes understanding of beliefs), and that it is possible 
for an organism to have experiential desires without 
anything like adult human beliefs. 
If Kennedy (1992) is correct in his hypothesis that 
consciousness is actually generated by the ability to 
process information about the brain's own states this 
would imply that most animals other than apes, possibly 
some monkeys, and perhaps elephants and some 
cetaceans, do not have sensations. However, both 
Kennedy (1992, p. 23) and Humphrey (1986) base their 
arguments on the assumption that conscious experiences 
are the only way in which an entity could use 
information about itself to interpret the activity of 
another entity. It seems to me that this is demonstrably 
false, since it is perfectly possible to imagine a 
computing system which could run a simulation of 
itself; compute the effects of varying inputs and use 
the output to predict the activity of a different machine. 
(ln fact so-called 'virtual machines' are already very 
commonly used for various purposes).As Searle has 
argued there is no reason to believe that such a machine 
would have sensations or experiences. If consciousness 
is not the product of self-referential information-
processing, the lack of self-reference in any species is 
not evidence of lack of consciousness. 
A third type of objection to a view of rights that 
includes some animals is that no-one can have rights 
unless they also have duties, or at least some kind of 
capacity for moral action. Ross's suggestion (1983) 
that the human capacity for altruism is based upon 
more primitive abilities to recognise distress in 
members of one's own species might lead us to the idea 
that some animals may have proto-moral capacities that 
we ought to value. 
Vicki Hearne (1987) has suggested that the 
trainability of domestic animal species is a variety of 
proto-moral behaviour, rather similar to early moral 
behaviour of young children that is mainly based on 
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obedience to respected adults. H. Davies (1989) has 
criticised the idea that trained obedience in animals 
bears any relation to morality in humans, stating that 
he has demonstrated by experiment that rats who are 
punished for eating food they are not 'supposed' to, do 
not develop a bad conscience, but simply learn to avoid 
eating when a human who might deliver punishment is 
nearby. This raises several interesting questions about 
the way in which true obedience (rather than simply 
punishment-avoidance), depends upon the relationship 
between the teacher and learner. It might be argued 
that the crucial difference between Vicki Hearne's 
dogs and Hank Davies' rats lies in the fact that dogs 
characteristically have a social relationship with 
humans in which the human partner acts as a legitimate 
source of authority, but there is no reason for the rats to 
obey-why should they? This does not imply that rats 
or dogs have a sophisticated ability to reason about 
sources of authority~necan imagine a rather simple 
system of proto-moral behaviour that could be 
compared to pre-schoolers obeying a known teacher, 
but not one they think is not 'supposed' to be in the 
classroom (Shweder, 1987). 
... A teacher from another classroom appears 
at the door with a child from her unit. Alice 
addresses them. 
1. ALICE: What are you doing in our class? 
2. TEACHER: Well, we came up the stairs and 
we didn't know where we were going and 
here we are. 
3. ALICE: Get out of our class. 
6. MR PRICE [Alice's own teacher]: You 
should be friendly to visitors. (p. 204) 
As with the idea that there are primitive capacities 
which underlie the human ability to generate a theory 
of mind, caution is needed in equating phases in human 
ontogeny with phases in the evolution of the human 
species. This is even more true if one is trying to equate 
them with the capabilities of adults at the ends of 
different evolutionary pathways. The validity of such 
comparisons will largely depend upon the extent to 
which three requirements are true. 
Firstly, that there are proto-moral impulses (such as 
reciprocal food-sharing) which would have survival 
value for any evolved social species. Secondly, that an 
ability to predict the behaviour of conspecifics will have 
value for members of such species. Thirdly, that these 
behaviours will then be modified by the amount of non-
moral evaluative capacity which the animals are able 
to bring to bear. 
Kathryn Paxton George (George, 1992) suggests that 
animals with proto-moral social behaviour should be 
regarded as 'virtuous agents' to the extent that they do 
act according to morally valuable impulses, but not as 
moral agents because they cannot make a moral choice 
to act virtuously. If this is so, these animals must have 
something at least very similar to duties, and the ability 
to remember and reciprocate good and bad treatment 
(tit-for-tat) which is such an important part of proto-
moral behaviour comes very close to the kinds of ability 
demanded for a Rawlsian method of decision-making. 
If morality depends upon the possession of a 
theory of mind, and some animals have a primitive 
T.O.M., then these animals possibly also have genuine 
protomoral behaviour, and hence a special value in a 
theory of ethics which bases rights upon the possession 
of duties. 
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